Supreme Court Decisions

Interesting Article
In this case, the Japanese company holding the rights to the One Piece copyright joined the prosecution as a co-plaintiff against the first defendant, who operated a Facebook page selling sportswear. The defendant advertised shirts printed with the image of “Monkey D. Luffy” and accepted orders to manufacture shirts bearing the copyrighted character without authorization.
Although the order in question was placed by personnel acting for a sub-authorized representative of the copyright owner, the Supreme Court held that this did not amount to inducing the defendant to commit an offense. The defendant had already advertised the copyrighted character on the Facebook page and had previously accepted orders to manufacture similar shirts for other customers. These circumstances showed that the defendant was already engaged in the conduct and knew, or had reasonable grounds to know, that the character artwork was protected by copyright.The Court further held that the co-plaintiff was legally an injured party entitled to pursue the case. Although the co-plaintiff had not appealed on the civil damages issue, the Supreme Court could still consider and order the first defendant to pay damages because the matter involved a question of law concerning public order.The first defendant was therefore found guilty of copyright infringement for commercial purposes under Section 70, paragraph two, in conjunction with Section 31 (1) of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537, and was also required to compensate the co-plaintiff in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance.

Interesting Article
Microsoft brought proceedings against the defendant for copyright infringement arising from the installation of Windows XP, Office 2003, and Office 2007 on 41 computers at the defendant’s internet café. The plaintiff alleged that the programs had been reproduced from unauthorized sources without the copyright owner’s permission.
The defendant denied the allegations, and the Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently explain how the copyright infringement had occurred.The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that reproduction of a computer program constitutes an act directed at the protected copyrighted work itself, regardless of whether the immediate source from which the program was copied was an authorized copy or an infringing copy. Such reproduction therefore falls within Section 30 (1) of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537.Where the reproduced software is used for commercial purposes, such as by installing it on computers made available for customers to use in an internet café, the conduct may constitute copyright infringement for commercial purposes.The Supreme Court therefore held that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently described the alleged infringement as required by law and that the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court should proceed to hear and determine the case.

Interesting Article
In this case, the defendant operated a karaoke business called “Baan Klang Farm,” providing private karaoke rooms equipped with devices for displaying music videos and lyrics so that customers could watch the videos and sing along. The defendant had not obtained authorization from the copyright owners.Representatives acting on behalf of the copyright owner inspected the premises and found that copyrighted songs were being used. Video and audio recordings confirmed that the business was in fact providing karaoke music videos to customers.The Supreme Court held that making the music videos available in this manner constituted communication to the public under Sections 27 (2) and 28 (2) of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 and therefore required authorization from the copyright owner. Where the copyrighted works were used commercially, such as by making karaoke services available to customers in return for payment, the conduct constituted copyright infringement for commercial purposes.The Court further held that the business fell within the definition of a video business under the Film and Video Act B.E. 2551 and was therefore required to obtain a license before commencing operations. The fact that the business did not separately charge customers specifically for watching the music videos did not alter this conclusion, because the videos formed part of the services from which the business received commercial benefit overall.Since the defendant’s business had never obtained the required license to operate a video business, the defendant was also guilty of establishing or operating such a business without a license under Section 82 in conjunction with Section 53 of the Film and Video Act B.E. 2551.