Supreme Court Decisions

Interesting Article:
The petitioner was the child’s genetic father. His sperm was used together with an egg from a donor, and the resulting embryo was implanted in a woman acting as a surrogate. The child was born on 17 January 2558, before the law governing assisted reproductive technology came into force on 30 July 2558.The Supreme Court held that, although the law in force at that time did not contain any provision directly governing the petitioner’s status, Section 56 of the transitional provisions could be applied as the legal provision most closely analogous to the circumstances. In addition, because the petitioner had a genetic relationship with the child, he was entitled to file a petition seeking recognition of the child as his legitimate child.With respect to parental power, the Court held that although the surrogate mother was the woman who gave birth to the child and therefore had the status of the child’s mother, the Court could order that parental power be exercised solely by the father. In doing so, the Court gave primary consideration to the welfare and best interests of the child.This judgment demonstrates that, in family cases involving assisted reproductive technology, the Court does not consider only biological status or the terms of the contract. It also takes into account the genetic relationship, the upbringing of the child, and, in particular, the “best interests of the child,” which is an important principle in determining both the child’s legal status and parental power.

Interesting Article:
In this case, the defendants jointly hired several women to act as surrogate mothers and arranged for them to undergo uterine examinations and preparation, including embryo transfer procedures, for the purpose of delivering the resulting children to commissioning persons who were foreign nationals, both in Thailand and abroad.The defendants argued that, in some instances, the women engaged as surrogates had not yet become pregnant. Therefore, they contended that all elements of the offence had not been completed, or at most, that the conduct should be regarded only as an attempted offence.The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that once the medical procedures had been carried out to the stage of uterine examination, preparation, and embryo transfer, this constituted “arranging for surrogacy” under the Protection of Children Born through Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act B.E. 2558. Whether the embryo would subsequently develop and result in pregnancy was a natural biological process. It was therefore unnecessary to wait until the woman actually became pregnant before the offence could be considered complete. The offence was completed once the relevant medical procedures had been fully carried out.This judgment demonstrates that Thai law seeks to regulate commercial surrogacy from the stage at which the relevant medical procedures are undertaken, rather than waiting until a pregnancy occurs or a child is actually born. A person who procures, hires, or arranges surrogacy for commercial benefit may therefore be liable for a completed offence once the medical procedures constituting the surrogacy arrangement have been fully carried out.