Supreme Court Decisions

Interesting Article
In this case, the two plaintiffs lived in a house adjoining the defendants’ factory, which manufactured vehicle roofs and carried out spray-painting and metalwork. For several years, the factory generated excessive noise and offensive odors that disturbed the plaintiffs and adversely affected their physical and mental well-being.The plaintiffs therefore brought an action claiming THB 220,000 in damages and asked the Court to order the defendants to relocate the factory to an industrial estate or another location away from the residential area.The Supreme Court held that the defendants’ conduct constituted a wrongful act under Section 420 of the Civil and Commercial Code because the noise and odors caused substantial nuisance and affected the plaintiffs’ health and peaceful enjoyment of their property.However, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not directly demand an order requiring the factory to relocate. Decisions concerning the relocation or regulation of a factory fell within the authority of the competent officials under the Factory Act B.E. 2535.The Court also considered the scope of recoverable damages. Expenses such as installing air-conditioning, constructing a new house, or hiring someone to guard the property were considered too remote from the wrongful conduct and were therefore not recoverable.Nevertheless, after considering the actual harm suffered by the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court ordered the defendants to pay THB 50,000 in damages.This judgment confirms that although an affected homeowner cannot necessarily compel a neighboring factory to relocate through a private civil action, the homeowner may seek protection against continuing interference and claim compensation for damage directly caused by the nuisance.

Interesting Article
In this case, the plaintiff lived in a residential area near land used by the defendant for automobile repairs, bodywork, and spray painting. The activities generated substantial noise and offensive odors, adversely affecting the health and mental well-being of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s family. The plaintiff therefore brought an action seeking an order prohibiting the defendant from continuing the disturbing activities, together with THB 10,000 in damages and future damages of THB 5,000 per month. The Court of First Instance ordered the defendant to cease the nuisance-causing activities and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal subsequently held that, because the monetary amount in dispute was below THB 20,000, the defendant could appeal only on questions of law and not on questions of fact, and therefore dismissed the factual grounds of appeal.The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the principal relief sought was an injunction requiring the defendant to cease the conduct causing the nuisance. The case was therefore an action seeking non-monetary relief within the meaning of Section 224, paragraph two, of the Civil Procedure Code.The fact that the plaintiff also claimed damages did not convert the case into one governed solely by the monetary-value threshold for appeals. The defendant was therefore entitled to appeal on questions of fact.This judgment illustrates both the protection available to residents against unreasonable interference caused by neighboring businesses and the procedural principle that an action primarily seeking an injunction remains a non-monetary action even where compensation is claimed in addition to the injunctive relief.

Interesting Article
In this case, the co-plaintiff acquired ownership of the land by transfer from the estate administrator of the former owner and later entered the land to exercise rights over the property. The first defendant subsequently obstructed the co-plaintiff and erected a barbed-wire fence on the land, claiming that the property belonged to the defendant. The co-plaintiff therefore filed a criminal complaint for trespass. The Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty. However, the Court of Appeal Region 1 and the Supreme Court reversed that judgment and dismissed the charge.The Supreme Court held that the offense of trespass requires an act of entering another person’s immovable property with the intention of disturbing that person’s peaceful possession. In this case, however, the defendant had not newly entered the land after the co-plaintiff acquired ownership.Rather, the defendant had been an employee of the former owner, had been responsible for looking after the property, and had continuously remained on the disputed land since before ownership was transferred to the co-plaintiff. The circumstances therefore did not satisfy the element of “entering” the property under Section 362 of the Penal Code. Nor was there sufficient evidence that the defendant had unlawfully disturbed the co-plaintiff’s possession in a manner constituting criminal trespass.This judgment confirms that, in determining criminal trespass, the Court must carefully consider the chronology and legal basis of the defendant’s possession. A person who was already lawfully present on land before ownership changed hands does not automatically become criminally liable for trespass merely because a new owner later acquires title. The decision also reflects the broader principle that criminal law must be interpreted strictly in favor of protecting the rights of the accused.

Interesting Article
This case arose from a dispute between the defendant and Mr. Charoon, the injured party, who lived in a house situated on land belonging to the defendant. The parties were related. Before the incident, a disagreement had arisen between them, and the injured party had reported to the police that the defendant had broken a water jar. The village headman therefore asked the defendant to attend a discussion beneath the injured party’s house in an attempt to mediate the dispute.When the discussion failed and an argument followed, the injured party asked the defendant to leave the premises. The defendant initially refused and appeared ready to assault the injured party. However, when other persons intervened and restrained the defendant, the defendant left.The Supreme Court held that although the house stood on land owned by the defendant, the injured party was the person residing in and possessing the house and therefore qualified as the injured party for the purposes of Section 364 of the Penal Code.The defendant’s initial entry onto the premises was made for a reasonable cause because the village headman had asked the defendant to attend the mediation. When the dispute escalated, the defendant ultimately left after others intervened and did not persist in remaining on the premises in a manner sufficiently serious to constitute criminal trespass.The Court therefore held that the defendant’s conduct did not amount to the offense of trespass.This judgment illustrates that trespass cases require consideration of the right of possession, the circumstances justifying entry, and the defendant’s intention and conduct after entering the property. Ownership alone is not decisive.